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The Internet seems a natural home for the conduct of public
offerings, including IPOs. By now, nearly all investors with the inclination
and resources to purchase in a public offering have the technological
resources to do so electronically. Email and websites offer a low-cost way
to communicate information quickly and gauge interest easily with respect
to large numbers of potential buyers. The SEC's 2005 Public Offering
Reforms,' though no doubt more cumbersome than they should be, have a
carefully thought out approach to electronic communications. Indeed, their
most important innovation-permitting the use of "free writing
prospectuses" (i.e., sales literature) prior to the effective date of the
registration statement-treats electronic communication as the preferred
means by treating an active hyperlink as the equivalent of delivery of the
preliminary prospectus . Other forms of written communication require
actual physical delivery in the IPO setting, which is more costly and
burdensome.
There are more dramatic possibilities, as described and analyzed in
the papers in this symposium. Most notably, the Internet makes it possible
to change the very nature of the public offering process, shifting away from
the book-building system-which is very expensive for the issuer-to an
auction-style model in which investors will simply bid electronically for
shares, with the price set at the level that clears the market. The papers in
this symposium give many different perspectives on this potential, urging
caution before professing too much faith in the promise of the Internet as
the gateway for fundamental IPO reform. In their writings both here and
elsewhere, Peter Oh 3 and Christine Hurt4 have analyzed many of the
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institutional and economic challenges that Internet-based auctions face in
order to become fully competitive with the book-building process.
The basic point, with which I fully agree, is that the IPO is only
partly about efficient communication. Hurt emphasizes that one of the
crucial roles of the underwriting syndicate is to create demand 5. The old
adage is that stocks are sold, not bought-in other words, that it takes
marketing and sales work to get people to want to buy securities in a
company with no track record and hence little or no pre-existing credibility
in the financial markets. In addition to bringing marketing expertise to the
task, the underwriters act as reputational intermediaries, using their
credibility to vouch for the issuer.6 This is naturally expensive and risky,
and it is hard to imagine low-cost solutions to the problem of informational
asymmetry in capital-raising transactions because of this. To be sure, as
Victor Fleischer writes,7 sometimes brand names can substitute at least
partially in credibility-bonding (Google, for example), but this will be rare
and, even then, probably only partial.
I suspect, then, that sales and marketing efforts by securities
professionals will continue to dominate the public offering process, whether
through electronic or more old-fashioned forms of communication. While
book-building efforts will no doubt change in response to new technology,
specialist intermediaries will best be able to exploit these opportunities,
meaning that the securities industry will continue to play a dominant role in
public offerings. The potential problems-the anti-competitive behavior,
under-pricing, self-dealing and manipulation that Jim Fanto 8 writes about
here, for example-will be with us for some time to come.9
If so, then regulating the IPO will continue to involve casting a
wary eye on, among other things, underwriter and broker sales efforts. For
instance, we encounter an interesting regulatory point, because the
argument is sometimes heard that technology empowers investors (through
greater access to information) in such a way that they are now better able to
protect themselves. That might suggest that regulatory oversight is less
important. My secondary point in this commentary is that there is an
interesting and fast-growing body of empirical research on investor
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behavior,' 0 much of which now deals with Internet-based investing.
Understanding how investors make their choices is key to setting the right
policy, and so regulators should pay very close attention to this work."
Here, I want to offer just a few examples.
The most illuminating data comes from a broad database made
available by Charles Schwab, the historic leader in on-line investing. Brad
Barber and Terry Odean have dug deeply to look at the trading behavior of
on-line investors and found that the combination of informational richness
and speed of execution can produce interesting feedback effects.12 Positive
feedback-buying followed by price increases-generates a false sense of
confidence, ignoring the substantial likelihood that this was the product of
simple luck. The result is increasingly more active trading that mimics the
market in terms of the returns that are generated (i.e., no evidence of
abnormally high or low returns), but the investors are systematically net
losers because the increasing velocity of trading imposes large commission
fees. In an overview of Internet-based investing, Barber and Odean warn
that the trading environment there can create a false sense of investor
empowerment, and hence overconfidence. 3 That is something just waiting
to be exploited by savvy salespeople.
The common response to these concerns is that investors will learn
from their experience. But research regarding investor behavior gives
reason to doubt how effectively investors really learn. Negative feedback is
useless if either delayed too long or ambiguous, and both conditions
describe much of the feedback in the securities markets. My favorite
illustration of this is an experimental game devised by Don Moore and his
colleagues at Carnegie-Mellon, who had MBA students play a simulated
mutual fund investment game using computer-based trading.1 4 Questions
posed during interruptions in the game found support for the main
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hypothesis-that the players overestimated their chances of doing better
than average by game's end.'5 But that was not terribly surprising. The
more interesting finding came when they asked each player how well they
had already done thus far in the game. The players' estimates were
significantly greater than the reality, even though reality was easily
accessible through one or two clicks on the screen. People are motivated to
see themselves as doing well at competitive tasks, and may be selective in
perception when filling out their own report cards. That is another investor
tendency that can readily be exploited.
Another area where research into investor behavior has produced
intriguing results is in mutual fund investing. One reason this research is so
important is that there are distinct "channels" for the distribution of mutual
funds-direct and broker-sold. 16 There is ample evidence that investors pay
a high price for broker involvement; the costs increase without any
significant evidence of better returns. With respect to mutual fund
investments generally (including direct investing, much of which is done
via the Internet), we still observe that investors over-value some available
information and under-value other information. Most significantly,
investors chase trends and extrapolate excessively based on past
performance.' 7 Though they show high sensitivity to front-end load fees,
they are far less sensitive to less salient expenses such as 12b-1 fees and
redemption fees." Overall, effective advertising pays off well beyond any
possible useful informational content of the ads. 19
The bottom line of all this is that making information available to
investors does not mean that they will use it at all, much less use it well.
That is the concern, because as noted earlier it would be nice to think (and
securities industry advocates certainly claim) that Internet-based
information availability can be a good substitute for sales conduct
regulation. Information lets investors protect themselves. That will
sometimes be so, but the game still favors the skilled salespeople.
This is not an argument against either liberalization of public
offering processes or encouragement of Internet-based offerings, but just a
note of caution. The trend, to be sure, is against prior restraint in sales
practices and in favor of investor choice. My point is simply that regulators
and policy-makers keep a careful eye on Internet-based sales practices to
l Id, at 10,11,16.16 See Paul G. Mahoney, Afanager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 161, 168-69 (2004).
17 See e.g., Erik Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN.
1589 (1998).
18 See Brad M. Barber et al., Out of Sight, Out of Hind: The Effects of Expenses on
Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J. Bus. 2095 (2005).19 See Prem C. Jain & Joanna Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence
on Future Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937 (2000).
COMMENTARY: INVESTORS, IPOS, AND THE INTERNET
see where unfair exploitation might occur,20 and respond accordingly. For
this to be effective, however, there is a need for much more empirical work
about investor behavior, online and otherwise, than we presently have. And
this is a task that the SEC should attend to as well in the future.
20 For a first step by the SEC but one that has not since been updated see SEC
Special Study, On-Line Brokerage-Keeping Apace of Cyberspace, [1999-2000 Tr.
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,222 (Nov. 22, 1999).
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